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Reply To Valverde*
Paul B. Thompson**
L. James Valverde A., Jr.1 in discussing arguments put forward
in my 1990 paper, provides many good reasons for rejecting a
philosophy of risk which attempts to ground the concept ontologically,
i.e., on the basis of some object or class of objects that exist
independently of human cognition. However, he misrepresents the
central aim of my paper, in asserting that I wished to defend such a
view. In fact, I rejected the view he criticized and advocated one quite
like his claim that "... risk is not independent of human knowledge, and
is fundamentally an epistemic category ...." 2 in the 1986 paper he
cites.3 Valverde and I do have a difference of opinion, however, with
respect to the centrality of probability theory in characterizing what he
aptly calls the cognitive status of risk. In this reply, I will clarify my
position. In doing so, I will also present reasons for rejecting
Valverde's approach to the cognitive status of risk.
Nicholas Rescher 4 presented the most coherent statement of the
view that risk could be understood as a real object in the book Valverde
cites, but there are many hints at an ontological account of risk in the
* See Valverde, The Cognitive Status of Risk: A Response to Thompson, 2
RISK 313 (1991), commenting on the author's Risk Objectivism and Risk
Subjectivism: When Are Risks Real?, 1 RISK 3 (1990).
** Professor Thompson received his B.A. from Emory University and his M.A. and
Ph.D. both from the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He is Associate
Professor of Philosophy and Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M University. He
is also Director of the A&M Center for Biotechnology Policy and Ethics.
1 Supra.
2 Id. at 6.
3 Thompson, The Philosophical Foundations of Risk, 24 S. J. PHn. 273 (1986).
4 N. RESCHER, RISK: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCrION TO THE THEORY OF RISK
EvALUATION AND MANAGEMENT (1983).
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literature. 5 The ontological view is incoherent for the reasons
Valverde discusses in his paper, as well as for reasons I have discussed
in a series of papers and reviews. 6 Aside from Rescher's careful
statement of the ontological view, however, no author successfully
distinguishes an explicit philosophical commitment to the ontological
view from a common-sensical commitment to basing risk policies on
what is known about the technology, substance, or practice in question,
rather than upon speculative scenarios. On this more casual use of
language, "real," and "perceived," do not name ontological categories,
5 The view that Valverde attributes to me is probably most expressly stated in the
1976 Starr, Rudman and Whipple paper that he cites, but the suggestion that there
are natural facts of risk which are misperceived by the general public has become
dogma among scientists who study hazards. For example, H.W. Lewis [in his
TECHNOIoGICAL RISK at 33-31 (1990)] describes the well-known phenomenon of
familiarity as follows:
Ghost story writers, carnivals and demagogues exploit fear of the unknown. This
is one reason why low-probability risks often seem worse than those with high-
probability - they are bound to be less familiar.... People exaggerate the risk in the
unaccustomed.... Despite the essentially unanimous view of informed scientists that
the risk of [nuclear power] is grossly overrated, the fear remains.
Though Lewis never offers a metaphysics of risk, the most plausible way to read
him is that facts about probabilities establish the truth about risk, while elements of
familiarity tempt people toward error. Alternatively, it might be the case that the
word risk just means unfamiliarity, that calling something risky is a rough
synonym for calling it unknown. If the latter is the case, people who are cautious
about nuclear power may simply be good Burkean conservatives, people who resist
new things, rather than people who have misjudged the low-probability/high-
consequence facts about nuclear hazards. See my paper Biotechnology, Risk, and
Political Values: Philosophical Rhetoric and the Structure of Political Debate, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY: ASSESSING SOCIAL IMPACTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3-16 (D.
Webber, ed. 1990).
6 Besides papers cited elsewhere, see Thompson, Agricultural Biotechnology and
the Rhetoric of Risk: Some Conceptual Issues, 9 ENVT'L PROFESSIONAL 316 (1987);
Collective Action and the Analysis of Risk, 2 PUBLIC AFFAIRS Q. 23 (1987); Book
Review of Rescher's Risk, 9 ENVT'L ETHICS 91 (1987);.Risking or Being Willing,
19 J. VALUE ENQUIRY 301 (1985); Need and Safety: The Nuclear Power Debate, 6
ENVT'L ETHICS 57 (1984); Ethics and Probabilisitic Risk Assessment, in BEYOND
WHISTLEBLOWING: DEFINING ENGINEERINGRESPONSIBLIEES 114 (V. Weil, ed. 1983);
and Book Review of Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy, 30 CROSS
CURRMS 228 (1980).
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but instead are rough substitutes for "correct," and "incorrect," or for
"true," and "mistaken." It was in this vein that I interpreted Chauncey
Starr as meaning to say that we are obligated to act upon the true facts,
so far as we can tell what they are, when he discussed risk in terms of
"the reality of what may or may not occur, the analysis of it, and our
perception of it."7 In my 1990 paper, I called this a normative use of
the term "real risk," and sharply distinguished it from a methodological
use in which the distinction between real and perceived risk is used
(somewhat sloppily) to mark a distinction between the objects of
research in natural and social science. Valverde misrepresents my view
by running these remarks together, and by interpreting me to have been
endorsing usage that I was merely describing.
It is the normative use of the expression "real risk," that is most
important for law and policy, and which was the subject of my 1990
paper. Most people who use the expressions contrast real with perceived
risk in a context in which it is clear that we should reject the risk
estimates identified as "perceived," in favor of those characterized as
"real." This is, for example, the intent of many scientific authors (such
as Lewis8 ) whose analysis of statistical and experimental evidence
convinces them that the public has an inordinate fear of nuclear power,
pesticides and food additives. The common parlance is to say that the
real risk is much lower than the perceived risk. The implication is that
regulatory decisions should be based upon the scientific evidence.
While students of the social construction of risk will be able to
supply many excellent reasons why this implication should be regarded
with skepticism, there is something eminently common-sensical about
an injunction to act on the true facts, rather than upon ignorant,
reactionary or otherwise uninformed opinion. This injunction does not
entail anything very systematic or philosophically rigorous with respect
7 C. Starr, Introductory Remarks in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: HoW SAFE IS
SAFE ENOUGH? 4 (R. Schwing and W. Albers eds. 1980). See supra my 1990 paper
for the full discussion at 3-6.
8 LEWIS, supra note 5.
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to our concepts of "true," "fact," or "opinion." Indeed, its common
sense value relies upon the' ways that ordinary speakers of English use
the words "true," "fact," and "opinion," rather than upon any careful
philosophical theory of truth or of knowledge. Similarly, the usefulness
of urging us to pay heed to the real risks (of pesticides, of nuclear
power, of biotechnology), rather than perceived ones, relies upon fairly
ordinary ways of using words like "real," "risk," and "perceived,"
rather than upon any rigorous analysis of these terms that might be
given by philosophers or risk analysts.
Ordinary usage may or may not be supported by more rigorous
conceptual or cognitive analysis of these terms. However, when
rigorous theories substantially alter the patterns of ordinary use for such
words, there is a danger of miscommunication and even deception. The
danger materializes when authors use a word first in a common
grammar, then draw an inference using the same word, but in a
technical grammar. While we might be willing to accept the common
sense of acting upon the true facts, so far as we know what they are,
this does not commit us to accepting any philosopher's (or risk
analyst's) theory of truth, facts, or risk as the basis for action. It was in
this spirit that I offered "the causal answer," as an account of when risks
are real.9 We would be inclined to accept allegations of risk when they
are supported by an account which identifies the unwanted event as the
result of some cause or causes that are known, suspected or imagined to
have occurred.
The claim that a risk is not real, but merely perceived, is, on this
account, established by challenging the alleged link between cause and
effect, or by explaining why the cause or causes have not or will not
occur. My view is that our rigorous analyses of risk and causality are
9 I will leave it to readers of this journal as to whether it is fair for Valverde to
take me to task so severely for failing to offer a philosophically adequate account of
causality. I will simply say that I am quite aware that my causal account only works
so long as we do not have a philosophical theory of causes in science lurking in the
background.
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relevant to the normative use of the real/perceived risk distinction only
when they are shown to be consistent with these non-technical, ordinary
uses of the words "cause," and "risk." The non-technical concepts, in
other words, become a test for technical analyses. While a technical
semantics for these terms may sharpen or clarify the content of the non-
technical claims, it must not commit the speaker of these words to a
content substantially at odds with that of the non-technical usage. If the
philosophical theory of "cause," or "risk," turns out to deviate from
these non-technical uses, substitution of the technical concept into the
normative injunction to base decisions on real (rather than perceived)
risk is an equivocation.
As I interpret it, the causal answer to the question, "When are risks
real?" does not entail any philosophical theories of scientific causality
or rationality. Causation in the law is another matter. My goal was to
examine situations in which ordinary people (e.g. people possessing no
technical expertise) might ask such a question. The examples I produced
in my 1990 paper describe situations (the possibility of a snake in the
mailbox) in which someone is placed in the position of deciding whether
to take an alleged risk seriously. More broadly, questions about the
reality of risk are at least as likely to involve a judgment to hold
someone morally or legally responsible for the consequences of an
action as they are to involve ex ante assessment of probable outcomes.
Although we routinely use the word "cause" when evaluating moral and
legal responsibility, it is hardly clear that such usage will be supported
by either deterministic or probabilistic theories of causality that are
preferred in the sciences. In fact, some applications of such theories
make it hard to hold persons accountable for the harms they cause,
either because they make it appear that they could not have done
otherwise (determinism), or they make it appear that the harm was just
bad luck (probability) for which the agent cannot be held responsible.
This latter problem is especially serious for Bayesians, as my 1990
paper was intended to show.
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Valverde concludes by urging that, "Instead of focusing on
probability numbers per se, probability should be viewed more as a
general framework for structuring our reasoning about risks." 10 I
should repeat that I find Valverde's reasons for rejecting a focus upon
numbers compelling, but I would go much farther. I do not think that
probability should be used as a framework for structuring our reasoning
about risks. It is obvious that risk involves probability, but the rise of
risk analysis has created widespread assumptions that the involvement
of probability is more fundamental than it is. I have attacked this
problem from a variety of angles in a series of papers,1 1 and will not
rehearse those analyses here. It is important to note merely that, in
ordinary English, the word "risk," is an action verb. Risking is
something that people (or other intentional agents) do. Probabilistic
accounts of risk are idealizations which emphasize probability at the
expense of the active component in ordinary grammar, but it is precisely
the active component that allows us to hold agents morally responsible
and legally liable for imposing risks upon others in a negligent, careless
or imprudent fashion.
An alternative account would take the cognitive status of risk to
involve a classificatory judgment. Acts consistent with a "reasonable
man" standard are not thought to cause harmful effects suffered by
others (at least not in the sense of "cause," relevant to holding the agent
legally and morally responsible for harm). Harms that follow
paradigmatically reasonable acts are "freak accidents," "acts of God," or
"due to natural causes." While these categories will hardly do for a
philosophical theory of cause and effect, they do quite well for
identifying a broad class of actions that we may be confident of
performing without elaborate or even explicit attention to the probability
that harm to self or others will be the outcome. By contrast, acts
classified as risky are subjected to additional burdens of proof before
being judged acceptable. Formal probability considerations might enter
10 Valverde, supra, at 337.
11 Thompson, supra note 5.
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in excusing an agent from responsibility for harm, but they need not
enter in the judgment that determines an action to be risky in the first
place. The cultural norms that determine what is risky in the sense of
being exceptional, unknown or unreasonable are not fully consistent
with the probabilistic correlation of harm to a given act. Many acts
known by all reasonable people to have some probability of harm
(boiling peas on the stove, driving to work) are nonetheless thought to
be very ordinary, reasonable (e.g. not risky) acts.
It is, perhaps, ironic that paradigmatically reasonable acts both are
and are not risks, they do and do not cause harm. It is simultaneously
possible to talk about the risk of boiling peas, and to say that boiling
peas is not a risky act. Such acts are risks (and do cause harm) in that
they can clearly be correlated to harmful outcomes by standard statistical
procedures. They are not risks (and do not cause harm) in that their very
ordinariness exempts them from application of risk/benefit, consent,
catastrophic loss and other criteria that are the standard burdens of proof
for assessing new technologies.
I would agree with Valverde that risk analysis "... can be construed
as a structured process that seeks to arrive at predictively informative
assertions about possible events which, should they transpire, could
pose a threat to human health and safety. ' 12 However, this statement
goes a long way toward stipulating the specific policy context in which
risk analysis is appropriate, namely one in which it is important to
predict specific impacts upon human health and safety; but there are
other legal, moral, and legislative contexts in which prediction is not the
issue. A probabilisitic analysis of risk which gives us predictively
informative assertions about possible events may well be (and I would
argue, is) useless when applied to judgments about whether a drunk
driver should be punished, whether a manufacturer should be held
liable, and even whether securing consent from affected parties is
mandatory. What I called the causal answer provides a better guide to
12 Valverde, supra, at 323.
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these cases, and any attempt to substitute a probabilistic framework will
undercut established and effective principles for judging ex post
responsibility for risk. Furthermore, the ex ante case of evaluating new
technology may depend as much upon matters of intention, deception,
lack of experience and consent as it does upon predictive information.
As such, anchoring risk judgments in Valverde's probabilistic
framework does not go nearly far enough in rejecting the reigning risk-
analysis notion of real risk.
I will close by concentrating specifically on Valverde's comments on
my criticisms of "risk subjectivism." My point was not to reject
Bayesian concepts of belief revision tout court. I do not care whether
Bayesian probability theory is an adequate account of scientific
induction. I do not care whether it provides a good descriptive account
of human cognitive processes. 13 My concern is that first replacing the
broad categories of "the causal answer" with a probabilistic account of
causes and then taking probability to be a function of a person's present
information set establishes dysfunctional burdens of proof for
addressing many risk issues. Bayesians commonly say things like
Valverde's "... probabilities change or evolve over time; they are neither
constant nor fixed." Although I am satisfied Bayesians do not (usually)
mean it, they sound as if criteria for determining levels of risk are
entirely relative to the information set that is available to a person (or
organization) at the time that an estimate is made. If taken literally, such
a view would license some novel defense strategies. Is a drunk driver's
subjective estimate of the probability that she will have an accident the
appropriate basis on which to base the judgment that she ran a
punishable risk? Is a corporate engineering team's assessment of the
13 Again, I must confess puzzlement at what Valverde attributes to me. He seems
to say that I have misstated the Bayesian position by claiming that Bayesian updating
somehow "invalidates" prior probability assignments. What I did say, at 21, was
that, on a Bayesian view, new information "... cannot invalidate the judgment made
on the prior, more limited information." I think we agree that Bayesian
interpretations place the idea of "invalidating" prior assignments "at odds" with the
concept of belief revision.
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probability that O-rings sealing rocket engines will fail at freezing
temperatures the one that counts in establishing moral responsibility or
legal liability? Of course, when Valverde uses the word "subjective," he
is merely categorizing the ontological status of probability under the
mental or cognitive side of a metaphysical dualism. Let's see how that
plays in a legal proceeding.
I am confident that there are interpretations of Bayesian probability
that preclude such abuses, but I have yet to be convinced that they can
be expressed as concisely and effectively as the causal answer. Once
regulatory legislation has been enacted (and as long as it is
unchallenged) agencies like EPA and FDA can use fairly technical
approaches to the prediction of harmful events. Frankly, I doubt that it
matters whether they adopt frequentist or Bayesian philosophies of
probability, but if it does matter, that is not my present concern. The
public debates in which the language of "real risk," surfaces are not well
enough specified for technical concepts of risk to help. Either scientists
will need to speak English (which means that "the causal answer," will
do), or legislators, judges, juries, and maybe voters will have to learn to
understand Bayesian conditionalization. The inadequacy of the latter
alternative is, I hope, self-evident.
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